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OIL AND GAS-FORCED POOLING-PRODUCTION FROM
POOLING UNIT AS EXTENDING LEASEHOLD ON
UNPOOLED LAND UNDER "THEREAFTER" CLAUSE
By

ROBERT

L.

FRYE$

This comment was prepared in partial satisfaction for the
Rocky Mountain Mineral Laws Foundation Award made to Mr.
Frye.
The plaintiffs gave an oil and gas 1 e a s e to the defendant's
predecessor in interest, for a primary term of ten years "and as long
thereafter as oil or gas is p r o d u c e d from said land." The lease
covered several parcels of land, one of which was noncontiguous
to the others. There was no pooling or unitization clause. During
the last year of the primary term, the defendant commenced
drilling two wells in the area, one of which was on plaintiff's land.
Subsequently, still within the primary term, the defendant obtained
two orders from the C o 1 o r a d o Oil and Gas Conservation Commission pooling various parts of plaintiff's land. Some was placed
in a unit with the well not on plaintiff's land, some in the unit
which contained the well on plaintiff's land. The greater part of the
leased land, including the noncontiguous tract, was not in any
pooling unit. After the expiration of the primary term, plaintiff
sought a declaratory judgment that the lease had expired as to
the lands not included in the units. Judgment was for the defendant
in the trial court. On writ of error, held, affirmed. Drilling a productive well within a pooled unit upon part of the lessor's lands
prevents termination of the lease as to leased lands outside the unit;
further, drilling a productive well within a pooled unit containing
a portion of lessor's lands, but not on lessor's land, prevents termination of the lease as to leased lands outside the unit. Clovis v.
Pacific N. W. Pipeline Corp., 345 P. 2d 729 (Colo. 1959).
It may seem from the statement of the case above that the
court has purportedly decided two questions. This would seem to
be due to the form in which the case came up from the trial court:
the case was submitted to the trial court, as to this court, on an
agreed statement of the facts and issues. However, it is clear that
deciding either question in the affirmative would dispose of the
case.
It might be asked whether there should be a difference in the
answers to the two questions posed to the court. The difference, it
would seem, lies in the fact that when the well has been drilled on
the plaintiff's land, the lessee has complied strictly with the terms
of his lease-oil or gas is being produced from "said land." To hold
that he has complied when the well is not on lessor's land, it must
be held in some way that the well is vicariously on the lessor's
tract.
Nevertheless, the basic problem is that pooling either divides
the lease or leaves it entire. Where the intention of the parties is
t Mr. Frye is/a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
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not ascertainable, and especially where the pooling is compulsory,
the decision would seem to be one primarily of policy.
It is my intention in this paper to first explore some factors
in a lease which might make the lease divisible even apart from the
pooling problem, then to look at the factors which appear to have
been determinative of lease validation in pooling cases, next to
take up the question of policy, and finally, to return to the Clovis
case and examine it in light of the discussion presented.
FACTORS WHICH MIGHT MAKE A LEASE DIVISIBLE
(BUT WHICH SEEM NOT

To HAVE

BEEN DETERMINATIVE)

A. Noncontiguity of Tracts
As was mentioned in the opening paragraph, the lease in the
Clovis case contained a noncontiguous tract, and yet the lease was
found entire. When the pooling problem is not present, and where
the lease does not evince an intention that the tracts be separately
developed, it has uniformly been held that the lease is entire.'
McCammon v. Texas Co.2 presents a particularly strong holding
in favor of indivisibility, in a pooling problem setting. Here two
noncontiguous tracts were leased, and a unitization agreement was
executed by lessor and lessee some years later as to tract A. The
agreement "specifically p r o v i d e d that any part of a lease not
covered by the agreement was to be considered a separate lease
for all purposes

....

"13

Sometime thereafter, but within the primary term, the lease
on tract B was assigned to the defendants. A producing well was
brought in on tract A. Two months after the end of the primary
term, the lessor sent defendants a notice of forfeiture, which was
disregarded. Defendants unitized tract B and developed a producing
well on the unit, thereupon the lessor brought a quiet title action.
In giving judgment for the defendants, the trial court held
that the well on tract A validated the lease as to tract B. Since
defendants were not parties to the unitization agreement affecting
tract A, they were not bound thereby, and the terms of the original
lease were controlling. "(A) 11 the terms of the lease . . . clearly

indicate that the intention of the parties was that, though covering
more than one tract of land, the 1 e a s e was to be developed as a
unit." 4

Hillegeist v. Amerada Petroleum Corp.," although involving a
term mineral interest, is to like effect. Plaintiff owned two noncontiguous tracts of land on which he had given separate leases to
different parties. He thereafter sold a term mineral fee in one deed
covering both tracts, for twenty years and so long thereafter. At
the date of expiration of the primary term, production was being
had on tract A, but not on tract B. Plaintiff, in an action in trespass
to try title, argued that the deed had expired as to tract B because it
was given "subject to" the separate leases, which in legal effect
12 Summers, Oil & Gas 1 295, at 210-11 (perm. ed. 1959); Annot., 11 A.L.R. 138 (1921), and cases
cited therein; Discussion Notes, 5 Oil & Gas Reporter 261 (1955).
2 137 F. Supp. 256 (D. Kan. 1955).
3 Id. at 257.
4 Id. at 259.
5 282 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
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operated to s e v e r the two tracts, so that production would be
required on each tract to validate the "thereafter" provision.
The court, in giving judgment for the defendant, rejected the
plaintiff's contention on the ground that the deed was entire and
given for an entire and indivisible consideration. The parties, by
the terms of the deed, had seemed to intend an entire transaction,
so that production from any part saved the whole. The court had
this to say:
[NJ or do we perceive that w hen the deeds under consideration are treated as if dealing with two segregated
mineral e s t a t e s the situation presented is materially
different in the respects under discussion from that which
exists when a mineral 1 e a s e that is to remain in effect
during its primary term and so long thereafter as oil or
gas is produced from "said land" or from "the abovedescribed premises" is given on two or more noncontiguous
tracts of land; and the law a p p e a r s settled that in the
instance of a lease of the type mentioned production from
any one of the tracts of land described in it serves to perpetuate the lease as to all."
Mention should be made here also of Texas Gulf Producing Co.
v. Griffith,7 in which it was held that production in a unit containing plaintiff's leased lands did not validate the lease as to his
lands outside the unit. Although the decision is based on the constitutional question of deprivation of property without due process
of law, at least two authorities in oil and gas feel that the contiguity
factor may have importance, and cannot be ruled out altogether.'
B. PartialAssignment Clause
Although there was a partial assignment clause in the lease in
the Clovis case,' the court does not even mention it. In none of the
decisions cited in this paper has a partial assignment
clause been
held to make the lease divisible. Summers, 10 however, points out
that "In the situation where the lessor leases a single tract of land,
the lease upon a part of which is later conveyed by the lessee, the
6 Id. at 896.
7 218 Miss. 109, 65 So.2d 447 (1953).
8 Williams & Meyers, The Effect of Pooling and Unitization
Upon Oil and Gas Leases, 45 Calif. L.
Rev. 411, 420 (1957).
9 Record, f. 39.
10 3 Summers, Oil & Gos § 515 (2d perm. ed. 1958).
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Louisiana Court has held that a provision which permits partial assignments and allows the partial assignee to extend the lease as to
his portion by paying a proportionate part of the delay rentals
makes the covenants divisible upon assignment." He comments
that this Louisiana view is "questionable.""
The case of Kugel v. Young' 2 also deserves comment in this
connection. A lease containing a partial assignment clause was
there involved. One Young acquired the leasehold interest in a part
of the leased lands by two separate assignments, dated the same
day, relating to land in two different counties. Young tendered delay rentals on the due date, in an amount insufficient to cover all the
land in which he then held the leasehold interest. The plaintiffs accepted payment, but after discovering the error, brought suit to
quiet title. In writ of error they alleged, inter alia, that where one
person is the assignee of separate tracts (separate portions of one
lease) his responsibiliy for rental payments is not separate with
respect to each tract. The defendant, of course, contended that the
lease became divisible since the lands were separately assigned.
Said the court, "This is only incidental, but .

.

. (the defendant is)

in error. While as between the different assignees the lease may
seem to be divisible, as to the lessors it is indivisible, and they are
not obliged to keep track of who acquires interests
therein by as' 13
signment from parties other than themselves.'

Incidentally, it might be mentioned that the lease in Clovis contained a non-forfeiture clause,'14 which would seem to be often concomitant to the partial assignment clause,' 5 and in fact in some jurisdictions is implied if not expressly set out with the partial assignment clause.' 6
C. PartialSurrender Clause
The final type of clause I would explore under this heading is
the partial surrender clause. Although the lease in Clovis contained
such a clause,'17 the question was not raised on appeal, and probably
could not have been; for reasons developed below it would appeai
that drilling on the leased lands would avoid any such attack on the
lease.
Summers' has traced the types of arguments advanced against
leases containing surrender clauses supported by nominal or no consideration. His position is that the arguments are unsound, 9 but in
light of some of the pronouncements of our Supreme Court, the
argument that a lease is an executory optional contract should be
examined.
It was stated above that the lease in Clovis contained a partial
surrender clause. It should be pointed out that the "partial" clause
is no less subject to attack than the "total," because it is obvious
that unless there is some restriction as to how much acreage may be
11 Id.

at 440.

1 6 Id.

at 445.

12 132 Colo. 529, 291 P.2d 695 (1955).
1:1 Id. at 539, 291 P.2d at 701.
14 Record, f. 39.
15 2 Summers, Oil & Gas § 347, at 445-46 (perm. ed. 1959).
17 Record, f. 34.
182 Summers, Oil & Gas H§ 235-36, 242 (perm. ed. 1959).
19 See id. § 242, at 159-61. But cf. Williams & Meyers, supra note 8, at 444, where it is suggested
that a duty of fair dealing may arise from the inclusion of a surrender clause in the lease.
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surrendered (which there was not in Clovis), the whole of it may
be.
The ground on which a lease is attacked as being an executory
optional contract, and so void for lack of consideration, has its basis
in two theories; first, that the interest created by a lease is executory until production is actually obtained; and second, that prospective royalties are the only real
consideration given by the lessee for
2
the privilege of exploration.. 1

In Florence Oil & Refining Co. v. Orman' 1 the first theory set
out above is demonstrated. The state granted a lease to the oil company's assignor in 1894, for a twenty-year term, the lessee covenanting to drill two wells within the first eighteen months, and if those
two were dry, to pay delay rental until he again started drilling.
Three wells were in fact drilled in the first eighteen months, a
fourth in 1896. All were dry holes. The delay rentals are not mentioned in the opinion of the court, so that it is not known whether
they were paid; the opinion leaves the impression that they were.
At any rate, in July of 1900, the board of land commissioners,
without notice, cancelled the lease. In the company's suit to have
the lease reinstated, it was held that the "lease" was a mere license
to explore. Since no oil or gas had been found, no rights had vested
and the lease could be cancelled.
The second theory, that prospective royalties are the real consideration, is demonstrated by the case of Lanham v. Jones,2 where
the following language occurs:
(A) contract such as this ....

which was in fact merely a

naked option, with no definite time of performance, was
terminable by either party in the absence of any interven-

ing equities ....
(I)nstruments of this character are construed most favorably to development, . . . time is of the

essence of the contract, and the real motive for the giving
of such instruments is the development of the leased property. Therefore, such a lease or option is properly construed
strongly against the lessee so as to secure such speedy development. In the instruments before us the supposed
lessees were not obliged either to drill or to pay rental; but
they might, by payment of rental, defer development for all
time, and thus deprive the owner of the land of the principal consideration of the alleged lease.21
Nor would this language seem to be completely a relic of bygone
2 4
"
days. In a 1942 case

and again in 1949 2 our court has used lan-

guage very similar in tenor.
It was stated at the beginning of this section that a partial surrender clause probably could not be attacked after drilling has been
commenced on the land. The reason is probably now obvious: the
arguments above are all based on lack of consideration; when the
lessee begins drilling he is supplying the consideration which was
presumably lacking.
20 Id. § 236, at 145.
21 19 Colo. Aop. 79, 73 Pac. 628 (1903).
2284 Colo. 129, 268 Pac. 521 (1928); see Spaulding v. Porter, 94 Colo. 496, 31 P.2d 711 (1934);
cf. Davis v.

Riddle,

25 Colo. App. 162,

136 Pac. 551 (1913).

23 84 Colo. at 133, 268 Poc. at 522.
24 Mountain States Oil Corp. v. Sandoval, 109 Colo. 401, 125 P.2d 964 (1942).
25 Hill v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 119 Colo. 477, 205 P.2d 643 (1949).
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FACTORS WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DETERMINATIVE

A. Interpretationof the Document Authorizing Pooling
This factor would seem to be easily the most important in arriving at the decision whether a producing well in a unit will validate leased lands outside the unit.
1. Voluntary Pooling Cases
Two cases dealing with wells on the lessor's land in the unit
were discussed above.2 s Both hold that the intention of the parties,
as found in the lease or the pooling instrument, will be controlling.
Similar holdings are found in cases involving producing wells
not on the lessor's land, but in a unit with it. Buchanan v. Sinclair
Oil & Gas Co. 27 involved a lease allowing the lessee to pool "when
in lessee's judgment it is necessary or advisable to do so ....

If pro-

duction is found on the pooled acreage, it shall be treated as if production is had from this lease, whether the well or wells be located
on the premises covered by this lease or not .... ,,28 The court construed the language as requiring validation of the lease as to all of
29
lessor's leased lands, based on their holding in Scott v. Pure Oil Co.
An Arkansas case 30 involved interpretation of a unitization

agreement, which rather clearly provided that a well anywhere
within the unit would validate leased lands both within and without the unit. There was an additional factor in this case which
might be mentioned: the lease was executed after a spacing order
had been entered, and the court comments on this fact. "The original lease was executed with knowledge that rules of the Oil and
Gas Commission did not allow drilling on the grant .... -31
Trawick v. Castleberry 2 also involved interpretation of a lease
provision, and also held that lands lying outside the unit were extended beyond the primary term by the language of the lease. An
interesting side-light is that the lessee had paid delay rentals during
the primary term, thereby avoiding litigation during that time.
26 McCammon v. Texas Co., 137 F. Supp. 256 (D. Kan. 1955), discussed in text at notes 2-4 supra;
Hillegeist v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 282 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), discussed in text at
notes 5-6 supro.
27 218 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1955).
28 Id. at 439 n. 3.
29 194 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1952), 31 Texas L. Rev. 75.
30 Gray v. Cameron, 218 Ark. 142, 234 S.W.2d 769 (1951).
31 234 S.W.2d at 770.
32 275 P.2d 292 (Okla. 1953).
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on the ground that the
However, the lessor had asked cancellation
33
lease had expired at the end of the term.
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Hutchins34 presents the other
side of the coin-a case where the lessor and lessee had provided
in a pooling agreement that production on land within the unit,
even if on lessor's land, would not validate the lease as to lands outside the unit. The court gave effect to the clause.
However, at least one case has refused to give effect to the intention 3 5of the parties as expressed in their lease. In Smith v. Carter
Oil Co. the parties agreed that the lessee should have the right to
pool any of the leased land if it were necessary to form a drilling
unit, or to conform to spacing orders; however, the lease was to be
validated thereby only as to the lands included in the unit. A part
of the leased lands was included in a unit formed by order of the
Conservation Department. After expiration of the primary term,
lessor brought suit to cancel the lease as to lands not included in the
unit. It was held that since the lands were force-pooled, and not
pooled under the lease, the clause had no effect; the lease was validated as to all lands.
2. Forced Pooling Cases
It would seem that the question of validation of the lease should
be decided by construing the terms of the applicable statute or order in a compulsory pooling situation, and yet it would seem that
more often the courts make the decision on policy grounds. These
cases therefore will be discussed below, under that heading.
B. Good Faith
An excellent discussion of this factor will be found in a law
review article, under the heading, "Duty of Fair Dealing." : 6 It is the
authors' thesis that there is slowly developing a duty of fair dealing
between lessor and lessee:
It is not certain whether the so-called "duty of fair
dealing" is merely an application of the equitable doctrines
of unjust enrichment or is more extensive in scope. It is too
early to define the nature of the restrictions on the lessee's
authority in such terms as "good faith," "fiduciary duty,"
"standard of a reasonably prudent operator having in mind
the interest of both lessor and lessee," or the rules governing "waste" by a concurrent owner. In any event, it is certain that the authority given a lessee by a pooling clause
is somewhat circumscribed
despite the broad, unequivocal
37
language of the clause.
A reference to some recent cases will illustrate the point.
In Gregg v. Harper-Turner Oil Co. 38 the lessor had leased 160

acres to the defendant lessee. A producer was brought in on this
land in 1943. In 1947, after repeated demands by the lessor, another
well was completed, but abandoned as non-commercial. In 1948 the
33 Cf. Hill v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 119 Colo. 477, 205 P.2d 643 (1949), noted in text at note 54
infra.
34 217 Miss. 636, 64 So. 2d 733 (1953).
35 104 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. La. 1952).
36 Williams & Meyers, supro note 8, at 439.
37 Id. at 444. (Footnotes onitted.) See also Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration,
34 Texas L. Rev. 553 (1956).
38 199 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1952), 32 Texas L.Rev. 133 (1953).
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state Corporation Commission, at the request of the lessee, unitized
forty acres of the 160, which forty contained the producing well.
The other 120 were not pooled. The rest of the land in the unit thus
formed was owned by defendant lessee. At the expiration of the
primary term in 1949, the plaintiff asked cancellation of the lease
on the 120 acres not unitized, on the ground of failure to develop.
The court decreed a conditional forfeiture, dependent on lessee's
commencing drilling within ninety days. In the course of the opinion, the court pointed out that it was in defendant's interest not to
develop because its wells were probably draining plaintiff's lands,
that defendant testified through its officers that it intended to do
nothing about development until offset wells were required by
someone else drilling, that the position of other producing wells indicated that there was probably oil on the land, and that plaintiff's
royalties were substantially reduced by unitization, which was instigated by the defendant.
Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co.3 9 illustrates how strictly a lease may be
construed by a court in order to promote what the court feels would
be fair dealing. Drilling units for certain sands had been established
by commission order in this case, one unit of which included land
of the plaintiff. The oil company brought in a producing well in a
different sand in the unit, not on plaintiff's land, one month before
the annual delay rental was due. Rather than start a new well on
plaintiff's land or pay the $2,750 delay rental, the company exercised an option in the lease to pool plaintiff's land with the producing land. The court held that since the production was had from
sands other than those covered by the commission order, so far as
that order was concerned this was a dry hole. The lease clause provided that production from a well "completed to production on the
unit" would validate the lease. The court said that this well was not
"completed to production" on the pooling unit, because it was already producing when the unit was formed. Therefore, there were
neither operations nor production on the lease on the delay rental
date, and since the rental was not paid, the lease terminated.
The line may sometimes be difficult to draw, however, between
good business and conservation practice, and unfair dealing. In
Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil Industries40 the lessee exercised a power
in the lease to pool the land with other acreage, just a few months
before the expiration of the primary term. The land was pooled
with other land already producing, so as to save the lease. The court
held in this case that it was done in good faith, not only to save the
lease but to effect proper development and conservation of the
whole pool. In the course of the opinion, the court said:
Had this pooling arrangement been effected when two or
three years of the primary term of appellant's leases remained, there could be no question with respect to the correctness of the decision of Kerr-McGee to produce the entire acreage from this one well and to pay to each royalty
holder his proportionate share of the production. The mere
fact that only a few months of the primary term remained
does not change the basic problem with which Kerr-McGee
39 226 La. 417, 76 So. 2d 416 (1954).
40 217 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1954).
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was faced and does not make arbitrary a decision which
based 41
upon a consideration of relevant factors, was
proper.
It is interesting to note here that the action was brought on the
ground of lack of good faith. Although it denies the relief sought,
the court says, "Where discretion is lodged in one of two parties to
a contract or a transaction, such discretion must, of course, be' 42 exercised in good faith .... All the authorities are to this effect.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Two lines of decisions have developed in the forced-pooling
cases, seemingly without regard to the terms of the statutes under
which the lands are pooled. The first line is typified by Hunter Co.
v. Shell Oil Co. 43 and Le Blanc v. Danciger Oil & Refining Co. 44 In

the Hunter Co. case, the plaintiff lessor sued to cancel an oil and gas
lease as to lands not included in a forced unit, after the expiration
of the primary term. A producing well had been brought in on the
unit, but not on plaintiff's land, within the primary term. It was
held that production anywhere within the unit would validate the
lease as to all lands in the lease. The ground of the decision is that
the lease is not divisible, and that the plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law if the lessee fails to adequately develop the lands
outside the unit.
The Le Blanc case was a similar fact situation, with the plaintiff raising constitutional questions as to validating the lease on
lands outside the unit. The court reaffirms its stand in Hunter Co.
that the lease is indivisible, and holds that the pooling order is not
intended to affect lands outside the unit-but that all contracts of
lease affecting minerals are subject to the police power anywayin reply to the constitutional objections.
The second line of decision is illustrated by Texas Gulf Producing Co. v. Griffith.4 5 In this case it was held that a producing well
on a unit, not the lessor's land, would not extend the lease under
the "thereafter" clause as to lands outside the unit. The reason for
the holding is that otherwise the lessor would be deprived of property without due process of law. The court also says that this case
was not contemplated in the statute, and that the legislature cer41 Id. at 65.
42 Ibid.
43 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947).
44 218 La. 463, 49 So. 2d 855 (1950).
45 218 Miss. 109, 65 So. 2d 447 (1953).
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tainly would not intend to extend the lease to lands outside the
unit.
Assuming, then, that the language in a statute does not force a
conclusion either way, what should be the proper decision? Two
authorities in the oil and gas field have taken the position that the
Griffith case is the proper approach. 46 And it is recognized that
validating the lease as to all lands may in some cases be used to
work inequities. Especially is this true in a jurisdiction which would
follow Smith v. Carter Oil Co.47 and refuse to recognize lease provisions specifically relating to pooling.
On the other hand, the lessee would probably have a large investment already made in the pooling unit before this question
would arise; it would seem inequitable to force him to drill on lands
outside the unit solely to keep his lease, particularly if he has been
developing the entire pool. It should be recognized that developing
an entire reservoir may be advantageous to lessors as well as to the
lessee from a business viewpoint. For example, it is not inconceivable that a single lessee having control of the entire reservoir may
be able to command a better price for the product of the wells, with
consequent benefit to both lessors and lessee. Further, the question
of good conservation practices would come into the picture here;
it may be absolutely wasteful of natural resources to force development in such a manner,48 especially in view of the fact that a single
lessee in control of an entire reservoir can, and probably would
want to, apply the most effective conservation measures. He "probably would want to," simply because it is to his economic advantage
to obtain maximum long-term production; he is not faced with the
necessity in this situation of "getting his while the gettin's good."
In addition, as the courts have pointed out, the lessor has the protection of the implied covenants if the lessee attempts to use this approach to his advantage-although we must recognize that the time
and expense involved in bringing suit to enforce these covenants
may be an effective deterrent.
In summary, then, it would seem proper to me to first construe
the statute; if legislative intent is discovered, apply it. If the lease
contains an applicable provision, this should control. If this is unfruitful, the Hunter Co. approach would seem the better reasoned.
Tempering that rule by liberally applying the corrective factors of
enforced fair dealing and cancellation for breach of the implied
covenants, in order to discourage lessees from taking advantage
of
49
the Hunter Co. rule, would give lessors adequate protection.
It was stated above that it is my belief that statutory language
should control in forced pooling cases, just as language used in leases and unitization agreements controls in voluntary pooling cases.
This statement should be qualified in one respect: legislatures
would seldom, if ever, anticipate a problem such as the one under
discussion; therefore, the problem of construing the statute may be
hopeless. This may be the factor which has encouraged courts to
46 williams & Meyers, supra note 8, at 447-49; see Comment, 17 La. L. Rev. 433, 441-45 for a criticism of the Hunter Co. and Le Blanc cases.
47 104 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. La. 1952), discussed in text at note 35 supra.
48 3 Summers, Oil & Gas 0 516, at 444-46 presents a good argument for the conservation approach,
in a discussion of implied covenants.
49 In addition, a new lessor-protective device may be developed, in the farm of an implied covenant of further explorations. See Meyers, supro note 37.
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make decisions based on what are seemingly policy grounds rather
than construction-of-statute grounds.
Incidentally, forced pooling statutes have been found constitutional in all jurisdictions in which the question has been raised.50
The attacks have been from various angles, including deprivation
of property without due process of law, taking of private property
without compensation, and abrogation of contract rights. The statutes are generally upheld under the police powers, as conservation
measures or as adjustments of correlative rights.51
THE CLOVIS DECISION

As was stated at the beginning of this comment, it would seem
that the court need not have decided the second question presented
to them. It is thus possible that the holding could be classed as dictum, and the court could decline to follow the ruling in a future case
where the issue may be clearly presented.
In the light of the discussion heretofore presented, it is clear
that in my opinion the court arrived at the correct result. However,
this they did without consideration, so far as the opinion of the
court shows, of the statute involved, '12 or of the problems of construction thereby raised.
The statute under which a forced pooling order would be obtained in Colorado reads as follows:
When two or more separately owned tracts are embraced
within a drilling unit, or when there are separately owned
interests in all or a part of the drilling unit, then persons
owning such interests may pool their interests for the development and operation of the drilling unit. In the absence of voluntary pooling, the commission, upon the application of any interested person, may enter an order pooling
all interests in the drilling unit for the development and
operation thereof. .

.

. (Notice and hearing are provided

for.) Operations incident to the drilling of a well upon any
portion of a unit covered by a pooling order shall be
deemed for all purposes to be the conduct of such operations upon each separately owned tract in the unit by the
several owners thereof. That portion of the production allocated or applicable to each tract included in a unit covered by a pooling order shall, when produced, be deemed
for all purposes to have been produced from such tract by
a well drilled thereon.5 3
The problem of construction here presented would involve the
words, "for all purposes," "each . . . tract in the unit" and "each
tract included in a unit." It would seem clear that the statute does
not force a conclusion to the problem presented.
On the one hand, it could be argued that the words "each ...
tract in the unit," or "each tract included in a unit" apply only to
those lands included within the confines of the unit-that a pooling
50 Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 434 (1954); 1959 U. Ill. L.F. 543, 546. For an excellent discussion of the
history and present status of the low in various iurisdictions, see IA Summers, Oil & Gas § 106 (2d
perm. ed. 1954). But cf. Texas Gulf Producing Co. v. Griffith, 218 Miss. 109, 65 So. 2d 447 (1953).
51 1A Summers, Oil & Gas § 106 (2d perm. ed. 1954).
52 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 100-6-4(6) (Supp. 1957).
53 Ibid.
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order creates tracts "included in a unit." This interpretation would
result in validating leases as to all land inside the unit, but as to
none outside (assuming no provision in the lease itself). It would,
in effect, say that a pooling order divides the lease.
On the other hand, it is pertinent to ask what the words, "for
all purposes" mean, if they do not mean "to validate the lease as to
all lands included in the lease." "For all purposes" is strong language, and would seem to lead to the conclusion that the legislature
intended thereby to have operations or production save the entire
lease. Further, it could be contended that the word "tract" in context is ambiguous, and that if the legislature intended to divide a
lease by a pooling order, they could have used words which would
make their purpose clear-"each portion of a leasehold estate," or
some such wording.
Assuming, then, that the wording of the statute does not force
one conclusion, then the decision would properly be made on policy
grounds. This, it would seem, is what the court has done in Clovis.
From the discussion of policy above, it is apparent that my decision
on policy grounds would be to validate the entire lease; this decision is reinforced by a consideration of the purpose of the entire
statute-conservation is the objective, and conservation would seem
to be better served by keeping as much land as possible under lease.
As incidental to this comment, a word of warning might be
added for the benefit of lessees confronted with a situation involving forced pooling. In several of the cases noted herein, the lessee
had paid delay rentals to the lessor on lands outside the unit during
the primary term, while drilling operations or production was being
had somewhere within the unit. By so doing, they put off the day
of reckoning, but eventually the problem had to be faced-whether
the lease had terminated or been validated. The following words of
the Supreme Court of Colorado might be heeded:
Voluntary payment of rental is convincing evidence that
rental was believed to be due. . . . "Nothing to the contrary

appearing, it may be presumed that men of ordinary . . .
business capacity pay their obligations when due, and, assuming that the business of appellant was being conducted
upon business principles and according to the usual and ordinary business methods, we may assume that the payments thus made were on account of some liability then
due growing out of the transaction covered by the lease."
54
54 Hill v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 119 Colo. 477, 493, 205 P.2d 643, 651 (1949).
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